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A substantial explosion attributed to thermal decomposition of o,o-dimethyl 
phosphoramidothioate (DMPAT) resulted in 1 fatalities and 1 injury in Taichung, 
Taiwan, in 2016. An analysis of this explosion indicated that such an accident could 
have been prevented, or the consequences might not have been as severe if certain 
elements of process safety management (PSM) had been applied. Proper execution of 
process safety management, including process safety information, operating 
procedures, pre-startup safety review, and process hazard analysis, can prevent the 
occurrence of such explosion accidents. The impact of this explosion could have been 
reduced had these process safety management elements, particularly management of 




In January 31, 2016, a fire and explosions occurred in a plant manufacturing 
agricultural chemicals resulted in 1 fatality and 1 injury in Taichung, Taiwan. By 
inspection of the process and causes of the accident, it is found that the consequence 
of this accident might be not so serious or even the accident might not be happened, 
if some elements of the process safety management (PSM) were carried out 
properly. 
To prevent or minimize the leakage of highly hazardous chemicals, Process 
Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals, 29 CFR 1910.119 [1], was 
promulgated by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) of 
USA in 1992 after the Bhopal catastrophe. Processes involving some specific 
chemicals more than the specified threshold quantities were required to implement 
the 14 elements of PSM, employee participation, process safety information (PSI), 
process hazard analysis (PHA), operating procedures, training, contracts, 
pre-startup safety review (PSSR), mechanical integrity (MI), hot work permit 
(HWP), management of change (MOC), incident investigation, emergency planning 
and response, compliance audits, and trade secrets. 
The Hazardous Work Place Review and Inspection Rules [2], a rule of PSM in 
 
 
Taiwan, was promulgated according to Article 26 of the Labor Inspection Law [3] 
in 1994. It was required in Article 26 of the Labor Inspection Law: Without the 
approval of labor inspectorate or having passed the inspection(s), the business entity 
shall not allow workers to work in the following workplaces: … Most plants, with 
the workplaces belong to the hazardous work places, in Taiwan just want to pass the 
inspection, and do not have the intention to implement the PSM, exactly, before. In 
2010, three serious fire and explosion accidents occurred in the factory sites of the 
Formosa Plastics Group of Taiwan. The Formosa Plastics Group accepted the 
suggestions of the invited expert, Dr. Mannan, professor of Texas A&M University, 
to carry out the PSM. Recently, the positive result of the implementation of PSM 
was observed by the government of Taiwan. The Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration, Ministry of Labor (formerly known as Council of Labor Affairs), of 
Taiwan required the work places, in which basic petrochemical raw materials are 
produced through cracking reactions and manufacture, process or use dangerous or 
harmful materials in quantities at or above the threshold level to implement the 14 
elements of PSM, as suggested in 29 CFR 1910.119. 
 
Description of the accident 
 
Impurities of crystal was found in the chemical, o,o-dimethyl 
phosphoramidothioate (DMPAT), which is the raw material of manufacturing the 
agricultural chemical, acephate. It was decided to filter the impurities in the later 
January, and there were 40 tanks of DMPAT need to be filtered. Filtering impurities 
for DMPAT has never been done before. Since there is no filtering equipment, the 
DMPAT was pumped to a reactor, and heated to 40C. The heat source was 80C 
hot water, which was heated by steam from boiler. The impurities were filtered 
through a filter cloth by gravity. 
Fire and a series of explosions occurred between five and six o’clock. One man 
was moved to other place by the shockwave during the explosion [4]. The wall of 
the workshop building was deformed and bulged (Fig. 1). The reactor was 
disappeared in the accident scene (Fig. 2). The control room was destroyed, and all 
















Process safety information (PSI) 
 
Most Safety Data Sheet (SDS) described that DMPAT is stable under normal 
temperatures and pressures. However, the TGA thermogram indicated that mass loss 
began at 93.5C (Fig. 3), and the mass loss is greater than 20% for DMPAT being 
heated at 80C for 5 hours (Fig. 4). The chemical stability description in SDS will 
mislead that DMPAT is stable, and make the workers not cautioning against 
temperature control. The process condition frequently far from the normal 
temperature and normal pressure, and the chemical hazards provided by SDS may 
be not adequate for the process condition. 
 
 





Figure 4. Isothermal thermogravimetric data for DMPAT heated at 80C for 5 hours 
 
 
The information pertaining to the hazards of the highly hazardous chemicals in 
the process, one of the process safety information, required by OSHA of USA 
consists of seven information or data. Since the information provided by SDS meets 
this requirement and SDS is the only required information in the Hazardous Work 
Place Review and Inspection Rules of Taiwan, SDS is always the only information 
of the chemical hazards in Taiwan. SDS provide the broad information of chemical 
hazards, nonetheless, it does not provide detailed information for chemical hazards. 
The detailed information necessary for processes are different for different process, 
based on the characteristics of process. Take the accident process concerned in this 
manuscript, the thermal hazard data of DMPAT is the critical data. However, such a 
data is not provided by the SDS. This data not only can be applied in temperature 
control in the operation, but also can be applied in incident investigation after the 
accident. Only SDS is possible not to provide enough chemical hazard information 
for workplace. The employee should identify the detailed safety information 
necessary for the processes based on the characteristics of processes, and develop 
the necessary detailed safety information. 
 
Management of change (MOC) 
 
The manager on duty indicated that the reactor was used as a buffer tank for 
operation of filtering because of no filtering equipment. The reactor being used as a 
buffer tank is a change; the impact of change should be evaluated. Since there is no 
significant hazard in the filtering process, the evaluation was not performed. The 
purpose of MOC is to prevent hazards resulted from change. In this case, hazard in 
the process of filtering, itself, is not the key point; the assessment should focus on 
the hazards attributed to applying the existing reactor to the filtering process as a 
buffer tank. Maybe there is no significant hazard in the filtering process, itself, in 
this case. However, the failure of the heating system may make the temperature of 
DMPAT to be greater than its onset temperature, and the failure of stirrer may 
produce hot spot in DMPAT. Both failures could result in thermal explosion of 
DMPAT decomposition. 
The real operation is to pump the DMPAT to the reactor, and remain the 
 
 
temperature at 40C by the 80C hot water through the jacket of the reactor. The hot 
source of jacket, hot water, was heated by steam generated from a boiler. Any cause 
makes the hot water to be greater than 80C may result in high temperature of 
DMPAT. 
 
Process hazard analysis (PHA) 
 
In Taiwan, place which manufacture agricultural chemicals using specific raw 
materials was required to implement PSM. However, filtering the impurities of 
DMPAT is not a regular process, but an unexpected process, and such a process is not 
the area of being required to implement PSM. Thus, the PHA was not performed for 
the filtering process using reactor as a buffer tank. In addition, MOC was not 
performed for this change of using reactor as a buffer tank of filtering process, this 
change was not evaluated. If this change was evaluated by a proper methodology, 
such as HAZOP, not only the potential hazards of DMPAT in the heating process can 
be identified, but also how to prevent such hazards can be highlighted. Maybe this 




The plant manager indicated that filtering the impurities of DMPAT is the first 
time operation, the standard operating procedures was not set out. Because of first 
operation, the necessary operation time of each step is unknown. If the MOC was 
performed, a new operating procedure to filter the impurities of DMPAT by a 
temporary set of equipment including reactor would be developed. To ensure the 
safety of operation according to the new developed operating procedure, the 
operating procedure should be reviewed by a proper methodology, such as Job 
safety Analysis (JSA). The potential hazard in the operation can be identified and 
highlighted in the safety review, and the useful recommendations and suggestions 
can be proposed. 
 
Pre-startup safety review (PSSR) 
 
New facilities and modified facilities, when modification is significant enough 
to change the PSI, are required to perform pre-startup safety review by the USA 
OSHA [1]. The reactor was used as a buffer tank in the filtering process, the piping 
and instrument diagram (P&ID) of PSI should be changed, thus, a pre-startup safety 
review is necessary before the operation of filtering, based on the requirement of 
OSHA. However, the pre-startup safety review was not performed. If PSSR has 
been performed, the lack of standard operating procedures for filtering can be 
identified, and development of such operating procedures will be required to prevent 
the thermal explosion resulted from inadequate operation. More important, the PHA 
for the change not being conducted in MOC can be identified, the assessment of this 
change will be required, the thermal explosion resulted from high temperature 
deviation can be identified, the temperature control will be highlighted, and this 









The purpose of implementing process safety management is to prevent or 
reduce the catastrophic release of highly hazardous chemicals [1]. However, not 
only the release of highly hazardous chemicals can result in major hazards of 
processes. Explosions attributed to runaway reactions, the accident discussed in this 
manuscript, and oxidation reactions with improper fuel/air ratio are examples of 
major hazards of processes but not being associated with the release of highly 
hazardous chemicals. Since the major hazards of processes are not limited to release 
of highly hazardous chemicals, it is suggested to perform PSM for the processes, 
with potential major hazards of processes, rather than just the processes, with 
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